Abstract. In order to reason about the correctness of asynchronous circuit implementations and speci cations, Dill has developed a variant of trace theory 1]. Trace t h e ory describes the behavior of an asynchronous circuit by representing its possible executions as strings called " t r aces". A useful relation de ned in this theory is called conformance, which holds when one trace s p eci cation can be safely substituted for another. We propose a new relation in the context of Dill's trace theory, called strong conformance. We show that this relation is capable of detecting certain errors in asynchronous c i r cuits that cannot be d e t e cted t h r ough conformance. Strong conformance also helps to justify circuit optimization rules where a c omponent is replaced by another component having extra capabilities (e.g., i t c an accept more inputs). The structural operators of Dill's trace t h e ory | compose, rename and hide | are shown to be monotonic with respect to strong conformance. Experiments are p r esented using a modi ed version of Dill's trace t h e ory veri er which implements the check for strong conformance.
Introduction
Asynchronous circuits are enjoying a revival, as designers confront problems associated with the complexity of modern VLSI circuits 2]. Despite their many potential advantages, however, the veri cation of asynchronous circuits remains a di cult problem. Asynchronous circuits have been designed assuming a wide variety o f d e l a y models for gates and wires 3, 4] . Furthermore, a number of environmental modes have been used to de ne a circuit's interaction with its environment, such a s fundamental 15] a n d input/output modes 7] . In practice, the task of verifying asynchronous circuits is greatly simpli ed by considering only particular classes of behavior, e.g., delay-insensitivity 31] , where a circuit's correct operation is independent o f d e l a ys in circuit components and in the wires that connect them or speed-independence 6] , where a circuit's correct operation is independent o f delays in components, while wires are assumed to have negligible delay. Dill 1] has developed a trace theory for the speci cation and veri cation of asynchronous circuits. Trace theory uses the theory of regular languages to model asynchronous circuits by representing executions as strings called \traces." The symbols in these traces represent signal transitions on the interface terminals of the circuit being represented. Dill has also developed a veri er based on trace theory. The veri er has been applied to a number of speed-independent asynchronous circuits 8, 5 ] and has uncovered bugs in several published circuits 1]. Nowick 9 ] h a s i n tegrated this veri er into the asynchronous circuit synthesis framework used by a research division of Hewlett- Packard 10, 11] . Despite the impressive performance of the veri er, the veri cation criteria it uses, namely conformance, is inadequate to detect certain classes of commonly occuring errors that can be introduced during speed-independent and delay-insensitive circuit design or during circuit optimization. In this paper, we propose a simple extension to conformance, called strong conformance, and point out when this criterion is useful and interesting during speed-independent and delay-insensitive circuit veri cation. We rst motivate the need for this notion through some examples. Then, we present the theoretical aspects of strong conformance. Finally, w e present experiments that illustrate the strengths as well as the limitations of this notion.
Our work on veri cation raises a fundamental question: what are the most appropriate ways to compare asynchronous circuits, and when are the di erent approaches useful? This question arises quite naturally, because many comparison relations have been proposed in the area of process calculi such as CCS 12] and CSP 16] (for example, see 17]). Although we do not o er a de nitive answer to this question, strong conformance can be seen as one useful contribution to the practical veri cation of asynchronous circuits.
This work was principally motivated by our inability to reason about the correctness of some of the optimization rules used in Brunvand's asynchronous circuit compiler 18, 19] using existing veri cation methods. Section 2 presents the required background of Dill's trace theory, and de nes conformance, which is the comparison relation used by Dill. Section 3 de nes strong conformance as a small extension to conformance. First, we present an algorithm for verifying this new relation. Next, we p r o vide two examples illustrating strong conformance. Finally, w e examine the formal properties of strong conformance. Section 4 presents experiments with an implementation of strong conformance in Dill's trace theory veri er. Section 5 discusses results, related work and conclusions.
Background: Trace Theory
In the past decade or so, di erent trace t h e ories have b e e n d e v eloped by v arious researchers. These trace theories have been applied to the study of concurrent systems: by Hoare 16, Chapter 2] , to the characterization of CSP processes by Rem, Snepscheut, Udding 20, 2 1 ] and Ebergen 22] to the analysis, veri cation, and characterization of speed-independent and delay-insensitive circuits. This paper follows the version of trace theory proposed by Dill 1] , who has applied his theory to the veri cation of speed-independent circuits. Dill has also extended his theory of simple trace structures to complete trace structures (which are capable of modeling in nite computations) mainly for the study of liveness properties. Because the operations and decision procedures for nite automata on in nite sequences are much more complicated 1], it is not clear how successful the practical adaptation of the theory of complete trace structures will be in the area of asynchronous circuit veri cation. (For a discussion of related issues, see 23, 2 4 ].)
De nitions and Trace Structures
The following de nitions and notations are taken from 1]. Trace t h e ory is a formalism for modeling, specifying, and verifying speed-independent circuits. It is based on the idea that the behavior of a circuit can be described by a regular set of traces, or sequences of transitions. Each trace corresponds to a partial history of signals that might be observed at the input and output terminals of a circuit.
A simple pre x-closed t r ace structure, written SPCTS, is a three tuple (I O S) where I is the input alphabet (the set of input terminal names), O is the output alphabet (the set of output terminal names), and S is a pre x-closed regular set of strings over the alphabet = I O, called the success set. In the following discussion, we assume that S is a non-empty s e t .
We associate a SPCTS with a module that we wish to describe. Roughly speaking, the success set of a module described by a SPCTS is the set of traces that can be observed when the circuit is \properly used".
With each module, we also associate a failure set, F, which is a regular set of strings over . The failure set of a module is the set of traces that correspond to \improper uses" of the module. A failure set of a module is completely determined by the success set: F = ( SI; S) . I n tuitively, (SI; S) describes all strings of the form xa, w h e r e x is a success and a is an \illegal" input signal. Such strings are the minimal possible failures, called chokes. Once a choke occurs, failure cannot be prevented by future events therefore F is su x-closed.
As an example, consider the SPCTS associated with a unidirectional (non-inverting) buffer with input a and output b. I n t h i s c o n text, we view a bu er as a component that accepts signal transitions on a and produces signal transitions on b after an unspeci ed delay. I f w e w e r e t o u s e buffer properly, its successful executions would include one where it has done nothing (i.e., has produced trace ), one where it has accepted an a but has not yet produced a b (i.e., the trace a), one where it has accepted an a and produced a b (i.e., the trace ab), and so on. More formally, the success set of buffer is f a ab aba : : :g. This set is a record of all the partial histories (including the empty one, ), of successful executions of buffer. An example of an improper usage of buffer|a choke|is the trace aa. Once input a has arrived, a second change in a is illegal since it may cause unpredictable output behavior. A bu er of this type can be used to model a wire with some delay. Therefore, to transform a speed-independent circuit int o a d e l a y-insensitive circuit in the context of Dill's trace theory, bu ers are attached to the terminals of the circuit.
We can denote the success set of a SPCTS using a state-transition notation. The success set of buffer, described earlier, is captured by the following speci cation, where buffer is regarded as a process:
In a process description, we use`j' t o d e n o t e choice, !' to denote sequencing, and a system of tail recursive equations to capture repetitive b e h a vior. We use symbols such a s a? to denote incoming transitions (rising or falling) and b! to denote outgoing transitions (rising or falling). The above speci cation of buffer corresponds to the nite automaton in Figure 1 When we specify a SPCTS, we generally specify only its success set its input and output alphabet are usually clear from the context, and hence are omitted.
Operations on Trace Structures
There are two fundamental operations on trace structures: compose (k) nds the concurrent behavior of two circuits that have some wires connected, and hide makes some output wires unobservable (suppressing irrelevant details of a circuit's operation). A third operation, rename, a l l o ws the user to generate modules from templates by renaming wires.
We consider the compose operation in more detail below (for further discussion, see 1]). The compose operator models the e ect of connecting identically named wires between two circuits, called Step 2 then eliminates any \ i n ternal failures" that may b e p r e s e n t i n S 0 AB (to be discussed below), to result in the nal success set, S AB . T o help de ne S 0 AB , w e de ne x # as the projection of trace x onto the alphabet . The projection retains, in order, all the symbols in x that are also in . F or example, abc # f c ag = ac, a n d abc # f dg = .
Step 1 Step 2: This phase eliminates \internal failures" from S 0 AB to obtain the nal success set, S AB . Consider a trace x 2 S 0 AB , which is a success in both components. Suppose that component A can successfully \extend" trace x by producing output a, where a then causes a failure in component B. In this case, once trace x has occurred, the composite circuit can cause its own failure, since component A may generate output a. As a result, to guarantee no failure in the composed circuit, trace x itself must be avoided | in e ect, x must be classi ed directly as a failure. In general, a success trace x in the composed circuit is called an autofailure if x can be extended by one or more outputs to produce a failure in the composed circuit. The process of obtaining S AB from S 0 AB intuitively \exports" an internal failure to the interface of the circuit. That is, any input signal which ultimately causes a failure is considered as the direct cause of failure. Formally, w e obtain S AB from S 0 AB as follows: Initially, l e t S AB = S 0 AB . F or each t r a c e x 2 S AB and nite sequence of output symbols y 2 O AB , i f ( xy # A ) 2 F A or (xy # B ) 2 F B , then S AB := S AB ; x (i.e., remove x from S AB ). The resulting set S AB is the nal success set of A k B.
Conformance: The Ability t o P erform Safe Substitutions
A trace structure speci cation, T S , can be compared with a trace structure description, T I , o f the actual behavior of a circuit. When T I implements T S , w e s a y that T I conforms to T S that is, T I T S . (The inputs and outputs of the two trace structures must be the same.)
Conformance holds when T I can be safely substituted for T S . More precisely, T I T S if, for every context T 0 , whenever T S k T 0 has no failures, T I k T 0 has no failures, either. Intuitively, T I : (a) m ust be able to handle every input that T S can handle (otherwise, T I could fail in a context where T S would have succeeded) and (b) m ust not produce an output unless T S could produce it (otherwise, T I could cause a failure in the surrounding circuitry when T S would not).
We illustrate these two facets of conformance, rst considering restrictions on input behavior (case (a)). Clearly it is not safe to substitute J1 f o r J in all environments: J1 cannot accept a transition on b as its rst input, whereas the environment is allowed to generate a b as its rst output transition, because this would have been acceptable for J. F ormally, w e s a y J1 6 J, since the implementation cannot accept an input transition which the speci cation can receive.
However, it is safe to substitute J for J1, since J can handle every input (and more) that J1 can handle so J J1. Thus, conformance allows an implementation to have \more general" input behavior than its speci cation.
Next, consider the case of restrictions on output behavior (case (b) a b o ve). We begin with a simple case: However, SEQNTLMODcan be safely substituted for CONCURMODin any e n vironment. Any e n vironment accepting outputs from CONCURMODwill also accept outputs generated by SEQNTLMOD, s o SEQNTLMOD CONCURMOD. Thus, conformance allows an implementation to have \more constrained" output behavior than its speci cation.
This latter point can be illustrated more dramatically. W e consider the earlier JOIN speci cation, J, and a new implementation: AlmostWood = a? ! b? ! c! ! AlmostWood j b? ! a? ! AlmostWood J can be safely implemented by AlmostWood in any c o n text for the following reason. As long as the component a n d i t s e n vironment generate the sequence abcabcabc : : :, J and AlmostWood behave alike. However, suppose that the environment generates the string ba and waits for output c. J will generate a c after seeing ba, thereby allowing the environment to proceed. AlmostWood, on the other hand, outputs nothing, and waits for a further a or b | at the same time as the environment is waiting for a c. In this case, the result is a deadlock. However, because no incorrect outputs are generated, AlmostWood is a safe substitution for J that is, AlmostWood J. This implementation also conforms to J: BlockOfWood does nothing useful, but neither does it cause any failures. In summary, conformance allows an implementation to be a re nement of a speci cation: an implementation may h a ve \more general" input behavior or \more constrained" output behavior than its speci cation. However, in practice, one often wants to show not only that an implementation does no harm, but that it also does something useful. Unfortunately, pre x-closed trace theory cannot distinguish \constrained" output behavior from deadlock. In spite of the usefulness of trace theory, this is its greatest practical weakness.
On Establishing Conformance
As discussed earlier, in order to establish whether an implementation I conforms to a speci cation S (i.e., T I T S ), it is necessary in principle to show that I can be safely substituted for S in all contexts. Fortunately, a simpler method was rst proposed by Ebergen 22] and further developed in the context of his work by D i l l 1 ]. The mirror, T S , o f S is de ned as the trace structure whose input set is the output set of T S , whose output set is the input set of T S , and which has the same success set of T S . I n tuitively, the mirror is the worst-case environment which will \break" any trace structure that is not a true implementation of T S .
More formally, given SPCTS T I and T S (with non-empty success sets), T I T S if and only if T I k T S is failure-free (i.e., has an empty failure set). This result is proved and justi ed in 1]. Speci cally, the mirror T S produces as an output everything that T S accepts as an input, so if T I fails on any of these, there will be a failure in T I k T S . Similarly, T S accepts as an input only what T S produces as an output, so if T I produces something else, there will be a failure in T I k T S as well.
Using this result, Dill has developed a veri er to establish conformance. Given implementation I and speci cation S, with respective trace structures T I and T S , the veri er determines if T I T S as follows:
1. Trace structures T I and T S are represented by deterministic nite automata 13]. 2. Trace structure T S is constructed. 3. The parallel composition, T I k T S , of implementation, T I and mirror, T S , is obtained, using the product construction method described above. To illustrate the algorithm presented in Figure 2 , we determine if the modi ed JOIN element, J1, conforms to the JOIN element, J, described earlier. The mirror, J, o f J is de ned as follows: J = a! ! b! ! c? ! J j b! ! a! ! c? ! J We next obtain the composition J k J1 using the product construction method. Of the two components, J and J1, only J initially has an enabled output in fact, both a! and b! are enabled in J. While the production of a! is acceptable for J1, the production of b! b y J will cause J1 t o choke. Therefore, J1 6 J.
Strong Conformance
De nition: We de ne T v T 0 , read T conforms strongly to T 0 , i f T T 0 and S T S T 0 . The algorithm to check for strong conformance is presented in Figure 3 .
The strong conformance relation is safe in that it guarantees conformance. It is not, h o wever, guaranteed to catch all liveness failures but for a number of examples, a veri er based on strong conformance provides much better error detection capabilities than conformance.
Examples Illustrating Strong Conformance Example 1
Consider a speci cation for an asynchronous circuit to be built, given in a state-transition notation: 0 ! ! Wi r e B TwoWires is an \over-implementation" since it can accept more input sequences than required for example, one a followed by one b. ( 
Properties of the Strong Conformance Relation
Strong conformance is a transitive relation, because and are transitive. Other important properties of strong conformance are proved below.
Proposition. compose, rename, and hide are monotonic with respect to strong conformance. Proof Outline. These structural operators are monotonic with respect to as shown in 1, Page 58]. We are now required to show the additional facts that S B S A implies: S hide(X)(B) S hide(X)(A)
S rename(r)(B) S rename(r)(A)
S BkC S AkC 2 Viewed yet another way, B can be replaced for A in any e n vironment, up to the maximal environment A, and one will not observe a n y di erence in the set of transactions that can cross the boundary between A and A or A and B.
This proof exactly characterizes the notion of strong conformance: B conforms strongly to A if B may o er to accept excess inputs in certain states where A cannot accept them. This excess capability o f B is harmless, because the maximal environment o f A cannot make use of this capability when B is used as a replacement f o r A.
Experimental Results

Error Detection in Queue Cell
A queue cell concur-Q is speci ed by the Petri net 14, 8] in Figure 4 , where the queue capacity is set to 1. The queue cell can be realized using the familiar micropipeline circuit QIMP1 shown in Figure 5 .
Suppose that the circuit is erroneously implemented as QIMP2. QIMP2 is identical to QIMP1 except for a missing inversion bubble. (The QIMP2 description may be the result of a transcription or editing error, for example.) This \implementation" does nothing wrong, but deadlocks immediately. The trace indicates that the implementation cannot produce output AIN after receiving RIN, while concur-Q can.
This example shows that strong conformance can detect certain forms of deadlock that are not detected by conformance. More precisely, if after seeing trace x, the speci cation has a successful extension through output o while the implementation does not, strong conformance fails.
1-Location Queue in Place of a 2-Location Queue
Next, we experiment with a 1-location queue used in place of a 2-location queue. Conformance passed the 1-location implementation, since the 1-location queue can be safely substituted for the 2-location queue. However, this implementation certainly has more limited output behavior than the speci cation. The strong conformance check detects this limited output behavior it nds the following sequence leading to an error:
(STRONG-CONFORMS-TO-P *concur-Q1* *concur-Q2*) ... Failure path: (RIN AIN RIN AIN) The strong conformance check could nd this failure almost immediately. Increasing the queue size did not increase the veri cation time substantially for a 31-location queue in place of a 32-location queue, the error was detected after about 0.1 seconds on a 10-MIPS workstation.
Call-Merge Optimization
The initial circuits generated by either the occam 18] or hopCP 25, 2 6 ] synthesis systems have a number of redundancies. These redundancies arise because the HDL constructs are compiled without taking their contexts into account. During optimization, it is often possible to take advantage of a component's context, and thereby replace it with a cheaper component. An example of such an optimization, from 18], is shown in Figure 6 .
Suppose that a circuit contains the CALL element, shown in Figure 6 where the notation means: after performing a?, perform c 0 ! a n d a 0 ! in some order before repeating the behavior of CALL1 (and similarly for the second branch of the choice). The circuit, CALL1, can be replaced by MCALL1 (shown in Figure 6 ), which is smaller and faster than CALL1. Clearly is possible for MCALL1 but not for CALL1.
We h a ve MCALL1 CALL1 a s w ell as MCALL1 v CALL1. While the former check only guarantees that there will be no chokes if MCA L L 1 replaces CALL1, the latter check also assures us that MCA L L 1 can exhibit all the successful traces of CALL1. As a result, strong conformation insures that MCA L L 1 has neither the deadlock b e h a vior illustrated in Section 4.1 nor the constrained output behavior illustrated in Section 4.2. Strong conformance has been used to validate a n umber of other optimizations in the occam synthesis system 18] a s w ell.
Generalized Selector
An interesting phenomenon occurs when the speci cation for a circuit includes non-deterministic choice. Consider a generalized s e l e ctor GS:
where j denotes choice (in this example, a non-deterministic choice). When this module receives an input on a, i t m a k es a transition on either b or c. Clearly, AS is a valid replacement f o r GS. F or example, since GS can make a non-deterministic choice, it might decide to choose strictly alternating outputs (thus, restricting its behavior to that of AS). On the other hand, it is also the case that AS cannot implement all of the output behaviors possible in GS.
In summary, in this example, strong conformance is too restrictive a criterion from the point of view of \safe substitution". However, if what is desired is that every trace speci ed by GS is possible in an implementation, then implementation AS is unacceptable in this case, strong conformance supports the desired point o f v i e w . T h us, the appropriateness of a veri cation relation | conformance vs. strong conformance | depends precisely on the design goals being served by veri cation. This point is explored further in the next subsection.
A C a veat in Applying Conformance Checks
As shown in the previous examples, strong conformance can detect common errors (such a s omitting a \bubble" at the input of a C-element) which cannot be detected by conformance. However, in using the strong conformance check in practice, one must keep in mind the assumptions underlying conformance versus strong conformance.
To illustrate this point, consider the speci cation of a four-phase to two-phase converter with \quick return" (see Figure 7 ): QR42 SPEC= r4? ! ((r2! ! a2?) k (a4! ! r4?)) ! a4! ! QR42 SPEC where ((a4! ! r4?) k (r2! ! a2?)) represents all possible overlapped executions of (a4! ! r4?) and (r2! ! a2?). This speci cation describes a module which c o n verts from a 4-phase handshaking protocol (e.g., r4? ! a4! ! r4? ! a4!) on the left interface to a 2-phase handshaking protocol (e.g., r2! ! a2?) on the right i n terface.
Consider an implementation QR42 IMP of QR42 SPEC:
QR42 IMP= r4? ! (r2! ! a2? ! a4! ! r4?) ! a4! ! QR42 IMP This implementation operates in accordance with the speci cation, but the concurrent behavior of QR42 SPEC has been sequentialized. Implementation QR42 IMP conforms to QR42 SPEC however, QR42 IMP does not conform strongly to QR42 SPEC. The error-trace produced by the failed strong conformance check i s (R4 A4). That is, QR42 IMP is incapable of producing an A4 immediately following an R4.
Depending on the application, conformance might be the appropriate veri cation relation, since it indicates that QR42 IMP is a safe substitution for QR42 SPEC. On the other hand, strong conformance indicates that QR42 IMP has more constrained output behavior than QR42 SPEC.
In particular, QR42 IMP allows no concurrency between outputs r2 and a4. For certain applications, such limited behavior may be unacceptable strong conformance successfully detects an error.
This example illustrates that the usefulness of a veri cation relation depends on the intended design goals. Strong conformance is not a general solution to the problem of asynchronous verication. However, for many applications, it is a simple and powerful formalism for locating errors that cannot otherwise be detected by conformance.
5 Discussion, Related Work, and Conclusions A relation strong conformance between trace structures has been presented and its various uses have been pointed out. This notion is closely related to the de nition of decomposition presented by Ebergen 22] . Key di erences between our work and Ebergen's are noted below, and related work is also discussed.
Ebergen's trace theory is designed with di erent objectives: to specify computations, and synthesize circuits through calculations using trace-theoretic rules. This trace theory does not directly relate to circuit components for instance, two trace structures containing the same output symbol can be weaved. T h e \ w eave" operator merely captures constraints on joint execution it does not correspond to the act of connecting two circuit outputs. In contrast, Dill's k operator relates directly to the composition of circuit components hence, Dill prevents the composition of two trace structures having the same output symbol. In Ebergen's trace theory, the link between trace theoretic operators and circuit behavior is brought out through the following key notions and theorems: decomposition, DI decomposition, the separation theorem, and the substitution theorem. T ogether with a rich collection of equational laws on commands (where commands denote trace structures), Ebergen's trace theory is used to synthesize correct circuits, without having to rst \generate" a circuit and then \test" it using a v eri er (as has been the approach suggested here). A tool to demonstrate the power of Ebergen's trace theory, called VerDect, is now a vailable 30]. VerDect checks for Ebergen's condition of decomposition, in e ect performing a veri cation under the speed-independent model (delayinsensitivity is guaranteed under Ebergen's method of synthesis by performing a syntactic check on decompositions 22, 3 1 ]). Dill's and Ebergen's work address the two prevalent points of view: post-hoc veri cation after \intelligent h uman design" vs. \correct by construction" design.
The notion of strong conformance is latent in Ebergen's de nition of the decomposition relation 22, De nition 3.1.0.0, Page 42] | as was discovered after the fact by us. A similar idea called input liberalization has also been proposed by A d P eeters 32] | again discovered after the fact. However, neither Ebergen nor Peeters suggest using their de nitions for validating circuit optimizations, as we d o h e r e .
An alternative methodology for translating concurrent process descriptions in a simple language into delay-insensitive circuits is described by W eber et al. 33 ]. The correctness of this compiler is shown by exhibiting a bisimulation relation 12] b e t ween the state transition system of the input description and the circuit generated from it. The authors point out that in general bisimulation is too strong an equivalence relation for use in veri cation. For example, although the optimization illustrated in Figure 6 is certi able using strong conformance, the state transition systems of the unoptimized and the optimized circuits shown in this gure are not bisimilar. In fact, a notion of correctness identi ed by Dill 1] called conformation equivalence (de ned to be true when imp spec and spec imp), which i s m uch w eaker than the bisimulation relation, also cannot explain the relationship between the unoptimized and the optimized versions of the circuits in this gure. The fact that some correctness criteria prove to be \too strong" stems from the fact that optimizations, both at the high level as well as at the circuit level, do not usually replace equals by equals. However, bisimulation as well as conformation equivalence are correctness criteria that are useful in their own ways. Thus, we re-emphasize the generally agreed upon fact that for supporting hardware veri cation in practice, a catalog of correctness criteria is needed, and the designer should apply judgment i n c hoosing the \right" correctness criterion for the task at hand.
The process algebra developed by Udding and Josephs holds promise to contain state explosion 34, Remark on page 2], as circuits are derived through calculations in their process algebra, rather than veri ed post-hoc, as with Dill's veri er. However, so long as the two points of view exist | post-hoc veri cation after \intelligent h uman design" vs. \correct by construction" design using intelligent calculations |, both approaches have a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e t o p l a y.
Finally, w ork in veri cation of asynchronous circuits appears to be proceeding along (at least) two distinct lines: (1) a class of work that uses various trace models (2) a class of work based on process algebras. Many of the notions used in these areas seem to be conceptually similar: e.g., autofailure manifestation 1] (which c o n verts possible failures to actual failures) and may/must pre-orders (used by 1 7 ] ). However there are fundamental di erences between these approaches as well: e.g., unidirectional wires carry information only one way, so that a component cannot refuse an input however, a CCS/CSP rendezvous can be refused by not participating. One hopes to see unifying e orts relating these as yet unrelated e orts. 
